I am a PhD student at the Vienna Graduate School of Finance. My research interests focus on the economics of technological innovations in the financial industry. I recently released a paper that shows how blockchain-based settlement may introduce limits to arbitrage in cross-market trading. In another paper, I analyze how consumers react to the availability of overdraft facilities through mobile banking apps. I currently investigate the potential of crowdfunding mechanisms to elicit demand information and improve the screening of viable projects.
Before starting my PhD studies, I was a research assistant in the field of labor economics at the Institute for Advanced Studies and an intern at Ithuba Capital and the Austrian Financial Market Authority.
PhD in Finance, 2020
Vienna Graduate School of Finance
MSc in Economics, 2015
University of Vienna
BSc in Economics, 2012
University of Vienna
Reward-based crowdfunding allows entrepreneurs to sell claims on future products to finance investments. Entrepreneurs thereby generate demand information and may condition their investment decisions on it. I characterize the profit-maximizing crowdfunding mechanism in a setting where consumers have private information about product valuations. Two types of demand uncertainty matter for the profit-maximizing mechanism: the number of consumers who value the product and the magnitude of their valuation. Entrepreneurs may finance all viable projects by committing to prices that decrease in the number of pledgers, thus granting consumers with high valuations an information rent. If the forgone rent is large, however, entrepreneurs prefer fixed high prices that preclude financing of demand states with low valuations.
We study the consumption response to the provision of credit lines to individuals that previously did not have access to credit combined with the possibility to elicit directly a large set of preferences, beliefs, and motives. As expected, users react to the availability of credit by increasing their spending permanently and reallocating consumption from non-discretionary to discretionary goods and services. Surprisingly, though, liquid users react more than others and this pattern is a robust feature of the data. Moreover, liquid users lower their savings rate, but do not tap into negative deposits. The credit line seems to act as a form of insurance against future negative shocks and its mere presence makes users spend their existing liquidity without accumulating any debt. By eliciting preferences, beliefs, and motives directly, we show these results are not fully consistent with models of financial constraints, buffer stock models with and without durables, present-bias preferences, uncertainty about future income, bequest motives, or the canonical life-cycle permanent income model. We label this channel the perceived precautionary savings channel, because liquid households behave as if they faced strong precautionary savings motives even though no observables suggest they should based on standard theoretical models.
Distributed ledger technologies replace trusted intermediaries with time-consuming consensus protocols to record the transfer of ownership. This settlement latency imposes limits to arbitrage and hinders price discovery. We theoretically derive arbitrage bounds that increase with expected latency, latency uncertainty, volatility and risk aversion. Using Bitcoin orderbook and network data, we estimate arbitrage bounds of on average 121 basis points, explaining 91% of the observed cross-market price differences. Consistent with our theory, periods of high latency risk exhibit large price differences, while asset flows chase arbitrage opportunities. Decentralized settlement without centralized clearing thus introduces a non-trivial friction that affects market efficiency.
We provide novel evidence of banks establishing lending relationships with prestigious firms to signal their quality and attract future business. Using survey data on firm-level prestige, we show that lenders compete more intensely for prestigious borrowers and offer lower upfront fees to initiate lending relationships with prestigious firms. We also find that banks expand their lending after winning prestigious clients. Prestigious firms benefit from these relations as they face lower costs of borrowing even though prestige has no predictive power for credit risk. Our results are robust to matched sample analyses and a regression discontinuity design.
I was a teaching assistant for the following courses:
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